Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident

Volume 5 Index

Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: February 26, 1986 to May 2, 1986.

- FEBRUARY 26, 1986 SESSION (part 2 of 2)
  Lawrence B. Mulloy and George Hardy.
  Stanley Reinartz and Judson A. Lovingood.
  Charles Stevenson, B. K. Davis and E. F. Kolczynski.

Note:
Centered number = Hearing page
[bold number] = Text page.

[910] 1660

TESTIMONY OF STANLEY REINARTZ, MANAGER, MARSHALL SHUTTLE PROJECTS OFFICE; AND DR. JUDSON A. LOVINGOOD, DEPUTY MANAGER, MARSHALL SHUTTLE PROJECTS OFFICE

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, would you briefly identify yourselves and your position and a brief history of your association with NASA?

MR. REINARTZ: All right, sir. I am Stanley Reinartz. I am currently manager of the Marshall shuttle projects office, which incorporates the external tank, the space shuttle main engine, and the solid rocket booster.

[911] And my background: I originally went to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in 1957, after graduating from the University of Cincinnati in 1956 as an engineer. I joined NASA in 1960 and, after a period of work in the structures and mechanics laboratory, I became deputy of the- after being a project engineer, then became deputy of the Saturn 1, 1B vehicle project office, then moved into being deputy manager of the Skylab project for approximately eight years, director of the test laboratory at Marshall for a period of three years, deputy manager of the Spacelab payload project for several years, and deputy director of the special projects office for a period before I took my current

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position on August 31st, 1985.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lovingood.

DR. LOVINGOOD: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission:

I am Judson A. Lovingood, deputy manager of shuttle projects office. I have a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering from the University of Alabama in 1958.

Upon graduating, I worked at Martin Marietta in Orlando, and then I went to Honeywell, Incorporated, in Minneapolis. I received a master of science degree from the University of Minnesota in applied math.

I joined NASA in 1962. Until 1967, I worked in dynamics and flight control, guidance and celestial mechanics, in various positions. In 1967, NASA sent me to school for one year to complete my doctor of philosophy.

In 1969 I became chief of the dynamics control division of the aero-astrodynamics laboratory. In 1974 I became director of the systems dynamics laboratory. All of the above positions were in the Science and Engineering Directorate of the Marshall Center. The projects supported during this period were primarily Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle.

In 1979, 1 became deputy manager of the

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shuttle projects office, and in February of 1982 1 became manager of the shuttle main engine project. And in October 1983, when the main engine project was divided into separate development and flight project offices, I again became deputy manager of the shuttle.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.

How do you two gentlemen relate to each other in terms of your work assignments?

MR. REINARTZ: I'm the manager of the projects and Jud is my deputy, and he has worked many technical items and with his past experience in the engine area, I have used him for that advice in the engine area.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All right. And your immediate superior is whom?

MR. REINARTZ: Dr. William Lucas, the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, we would like to ask you some questions about when you were first made aware of this problem in connection with 51-L. And you know what the testimony has been, so we don't necessarily want you to repeat it all, but we are particularly interested in how it happened that the decisionmaking people, at particularly the Level I and II, were not made aware of all of these things we have been talking about yesterday and today.

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So will you- Mr. Reinartz, will you relate when you first heard about this problem and what you did from that point on?

MR. REINARTZ: All right, sir. With your permission, I would like to use my statement to pick up those major points, if that is all right.

[912] CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sure, that's fine.

MR. REINARTZ: My recollections of the decision process on a summary basis for the launch recommendation, Mr. Hardy and Mr. Mulloy have covered a lot of the detail of that and I will show how I interacted with that activity.

In regard to the launch recommendation process, I continue to believe that the activities associated with this process, specifically the January 27th discussion between Thiokol and Marshall, were conducted in a thorough and professional manner and in the NASA tradition of full and open participation of the personnel necessary for appropriate disposition of the specific concern.

And I think one of my roles in that was to see that that was carried out. It was a problem being worked by the shuttle rocket booster, but I felt it was appropriate to see that that was carried out in that manner, and made no indication of my feelings during the

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course of the discussions.

In the case of the 51-L, a concern was raised by Thiokol on the evening of January 27th, the night before the planned launch, concerning possible effects of the predicted temperatures on the solid rocket motor case-to-case field joint O-rings.

After this concern was raised, we set about an orderly and normal process set in motion to assure a full examination of the concern and the engineering data and the rationale associated with this concern. First we had an identification of this concern during the preliminary telecon early in the evening, and during the course of that discussion we had very poor communications.

We were at a number of different locations and were scattered. And so we had a request for Thiokol to supply their written data to us, and then we were to assemble all the necessary personnel at Marshall, Thiokol Wasatch in Utah, and those senior Thiokol project representatives at KSC, to get a good telecon.

The senior 51-L Thiokol representative was Mr. Al McDonald. Mr. Mulloy and I were the senior Marshall project representatives on site. Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury were in the KSC area for the launch the next day and had been at the 2:00 meeting that

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afternoon that set the plan for the next day.

Then, in an approximately two-hour meeting, Thiokol engineering personnel presented and discussed material relating to their concern. As Mr. Hardy testified, I believe Marshall thoroughly probed the data, and all parties had an opportunity to provide inputs and express their views.

After the initial Thiokol recommendation to not launch until the temperature was at least 53 degrees, Mr. Mulloy, as he indicated, stated a rationale that he believed supported a launch recommendation. I asked Mr. Hardy at that point for his comments. After Mr. Hardy's remarks, to which he has testified earlier, including his clear and unequivocal statement to me, as well as all parties on the line- it was not addressed just to Thiokol- a clear statement that he would not recommend launch over Thiokol's objections, I then asked Mr. Kilminster for his comments at that point.

Then Mr. Kilminster asked for a five-minute caucus. And I might say, Mr. Chairman, that with that comment of Mr. Hardy's, I took that as a very clear and direct thing, not only in discussing with Thiokol but to Mr. Mulloy as the project manager and to myself. And I look to the science and engineering group for engineering recommendations, and have worked personally

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with Mr. Hardy for 25 years, and know that when he says he wouldn't launch that he means exactly that.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I don't think anybody has ever questioned that.

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir. I just wanted to emphasize that point, sir.

At the end of the two-and-a-half-hour period, including an approximately 35-minute-off-the-loop Thiokol caucus, and after their recommendation, their final recommendation, to launch, I collectively asked all telecon parties if there were any disagreement with Thiokol's rationale and recommendation as stated by Mr. Kilminster.

There were none received from Thiokol at Wasatch, Marshall at Huntsville, nor Mr. McDonald, who was sitting with Mr. Mulloy and myself at KSC. Thiokol was then asked to document their verbal rationale and launch recommendation statement, as is our normal practice.

Based on the process I described and the conclusions reached as a result of that process, including the contractor recommendation and the Marshall engineering support, I concurred with the decision of the Level III project manager, Mr. Mulloy, supporting the launch recommendation and continuing with the launch

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process.

Before going into my post-decision activities, which I am sure are of interest to the committee, I would like to amplify one portion. During the January 27th post-scrub discussions all Marshall support elements and to my knowledge the contractor representatives at KSC were present on the launch center-Marshall voice loop when I made a request for capability to support a 24-hour turn-around capability, recognizing the colder predicted temperatures for the January 28th launch.

The senior Thiokol program representative has a duty station on the loop at KSC, did not provide any input on the loop or to the physically adjacent Marshall SRB representative regarding any items that should be looked into while proceeding with the launch preparation.

During the two-and-a-half-hour telecon between Thiokol and Marshall, extended over that time- it was muted for approximately 30 minutes- I would characterize the presentation and associated discussions as deliberate and intense, and a professional engineering examination of the data, and not highly heated or emotional. And no heated protest was injected into the open discussion by the senior Thiokol representative at KSC during that two-and-a-half-hour

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period.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Isn't it true, though, that you were made aware, because you listened to that conference, that Thiokol had recommended no launch, and that they were almost unanimous at that time in recommending no launch?

[914] MR. REINARTZ: No, sir, your statement about nearly unanimous was not a bit of knowledge that I had in that time.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many of the Thiokol people on that telecon voted in favor of launch?

MR. REINARTZ: As far as I know, sir, there wasn't any voting at that time.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, maybe not a vote, but I mean the expressions that were made by the Thiokol people up until the time of the recess. Information we have is there was nobody on the Thiokol side that was urging a launch.

Do you remember anybody that urged a launch on the part of Thiokol up to that point?

MR. REINARTZ: No, sir. They did not vote or provide

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not talking about a vote. I'm talking about did anybody express a view, we think you should launch the shuttle, the Challenger, at

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that point?

MR. REINARTZ: They had provided a recommendation that it not be launched below 53 degrees.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did anybody in the telecon say, we disagree, we think you should go ahead and launch?

MR. REINARTZ: No, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So as far as you knew based upon what was said, it seemed to be a unanimous view of the Thiokol people on the telecon that they were recommending no launch?

MR. REINARTZ: At that point in time.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is what I asked.

MR. REINARTZ: At that point in time, yes, sir.

The senior Thiokol representative at KSC did inject one significant comment just after- as I have said, Mr. Kilminster has asked for a caucus; just after he asked for this caucus, at about the two hour juncture in this discussion. This comment by Mr. McDonald was perceived, I believe, by all parties and, I believe, as testified by Thiokol in the hearings yesterday, as a supporting point for a positive launch recommendation, or at least a positive point.

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He did not make a statement, I recommend launch. Mr. McDonald said that Mr. Kilminster should consider a point made by Mr. Hardy earlier, that the secondary O-ring is in the proper position to seal if blow-by of the primary O-ring occurred. And I believe that Mr. Hardy tried to elaborate on the importance of the secondary O-ring.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Reinartz, during the caucus didn't you have a discussion with Mr. McDonald where he voiced his strong opposition to the launch?

MR. REINARTZ: Mr. McDonald during that time of the period that we were on that, he discussed some of the same concerns that were covered during the telecon and had talked about some of those concerns during that time.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And weren't those concerns- didn't that- didn't you draw the conclusion from that that he was opposed to the launch?

MR. REINARTZ: At that point I did not draw that conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that he was completely opposed to the launch, having made the statement that you should consider the secondary seal.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Didn't he recommend at that time to you that the launch be delayed until late in the afternoon, until the temperatures reached 48 or 50?

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MR. REINARTZ: I'm not sure whether that was done during the caucus, as Mr. Mulloy had talked this morning, whether that was during the caucus or whether that was in the statement that Mr. McDonald made after the telecon was complete, where he said that there were these three things that might be considered for a launch delay.

I'm not sure of that, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you're not really trying to convince the Commission that you didn't know that Mr. McDonald had serious questions about the launch and didn't really want the launch to occur, are you?

[915] MR. REINARTZ: No, sir. I'm trying to relay what came across that evening during the discussion, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. REINARTZ: Marshall elements in Huntsville and those elements at KSC, of course, as has been testified, had no knowledge of the internal Thiokol discussions during the 30 to 35 minute caucus that preceded their launch recommendation. At that point and to my knowledge, Mr. McDonald, who had indicated, as you had stated, some concerns, as far as I know did not take that opportunity to inject any of his thoughts or concerns via private telephone input into the internal

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Thiokol discussions that were going on during that caucus.

As stated earlier, when I asked all the parties collectively if there were any disagreements with the final Thiokol recommendation that I received from Mr. Kilminster, there was no statement or comment from Mr. McDonald, at that time sitting with Mr. Mulloy and myself here at the Cape.

Now, I would like to discuss-

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And so your testimony is that, after the decision was made, you were satisfied that Mr. McDonald had no question in his mind, that he went along with the decision to launch?

MR. REINARTZ: At the point, Mr. Chairman, when I asked very clearly and very deliberately on the telecon, while all parties were involved, I asked if there were any disagreements to all the parties, including Mr. McDonald, who was sitting right across from me, and there was no comment, no objection or anything raised at that time.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I accept that. But later on didn't you know he continued to object and there was a lot of opposition on the part of the Thiokol people?

MR. REINARTZ: I did not know of the lot of opposition of the Thiokol people.

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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you know that he opposed?

MR. REINARTZ: After the launch, as Mr. Mulloy testified- or, excuse me, Sir. Not after the launch, but after the telecon, Mr. McDonald said, after we had completed and hung up he said, well, if there was not sufficient reason related to the concerns on O-ring temperature, then how about the ice situation, and how about the recovery sea state.

And Mr. Mulloy testified as to the comments to the ice situation and to the recovery situation, and we participated jointly, which was the next item I was going to discuss- we participated jointly in a telecon with the KSC personnel and Mr. Aldrich about the possible loss of SRB parachutes and frustums resulting from that sea state.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But Mr. McDonald testified yesterday under oath that he had a discussion with you and pointed out there were three reasons why he opposed the launch, and one was the O-rings and the other two were the things that you mentioned.

Didn't you know that?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir. I said that he stated that, if- the way that I recall he stated it, he said: If that is not enough of a concern for you, is

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I believe the way he said it, then if I were launch director there were three things, that there would be that and then the other two that he named.

[916] CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Reinartz, the reason I'm pressing you, as I am sure you know, it's very difficult for the Commission to understand how this serious matter was discussed by so many people just prior to the launch, and there still were serious questions, obviously, in the minds of a lot of people, how those concerns were not conveyed to the people who had to make the ultimate decision whether the shuttle would be launched or not.

That is what is very difficult for us to understand.

MR. REINARTZ: I can appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, the difficulty that you are having, and the people, each one of us, collectively going back to that point in time.

But I think it is important to differentiate between a couple of items. We had the knowledge that evening, Mr. Chairman, of the data that Thiokol presented in their charts and the discussion that was in that telecon. I did not know of any memos that had been circulated, that have been now said they were circulated to some levels within Thiokol. I had none of

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that knowledge.

I had none of the knowledge of any dissension that was going on within the internal discussion at Thiokol. None of that was available.

Mr. McDonald had the opportunity to inject anything into that Thiokol internal if he chose to. As far as I know, there was nothing constraining him. And the only thing that I had, after the results that I had, the recommendation from the Thiokol program manager, I had the Marshall engineering support of that activity, and I had the SRB manager's decision that he wanted to proceed, which I concurred with.

And those were the inputs that I had that evening at that point in time. And then Mr. McDonald said- he did not make any statement that said, hey, I want to go take this to anybody else, or I have a difficulty with this.

He said: If I was launch director, these are the things that I would be considering for tomorrow.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I really don't intend to make it just a matter of Mr. McDonald and you. It is much more serious than that, it seems to me. Let's assume that you were satisfied with all of the paperwork, and let's assume when you got the telefax you said: Ah, we've got the piece of paper from Thiokol.

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Knowing what you knew, didn't you have in your own mind some question about the wisdom of going ahead with the launch? Or were you totally satisfied that there was no problem?

MR. REINARTZ: I was satisfied that there was not a flight safety problem, based on the discussion and the advice that I got related to that. That was made up of two parts: the final recommendation from Thiokol program manager and the input from the Marshall engineering people, as detailed by Mr. Hardy.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At the time of the telecon and before you got the piece of paper telefaxed, listening to the arguments, didn't you have some concern about the safety of that launch?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir. I have concerns about the safety of every launch.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I mean, this one, a little more so on this one. Did you ever have a situation where the recommendation from the contractor was no launch and then they changed their mind as a result of urging on the part of NASA?

MR. REINARTZ: I would like to answer that question in two parts, if I may. I am not aware- I have not personally participated in that exact situation as you described.

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And secondly, I did not urge, nor do I think my people urged, Thiokol to change their recommendation.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I will withdraw that part of the question. Do you ever remember or do you know of any situation where the contractor at any time recommended no launch and subsequently changed their minds?

MR. REINARTZ: I do not recall personally being in that situation.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And wouldn't that call to your attention the seriousness of the situation?

MR. REINARTZ: The seriousness of the situation was certainly recognized and examined by us. But I think it is important to understand at the same time that we- that Thiokol had indicated to us during the telecon that they were still working the problem, as I think has been testified to by Thiokol, that there were some parallel activities going on at the same time that was being worked.

And the only- when I asked for comments to Thiokol, I was not asking for a change of decision. I was wanting to be sure that all of their activities that they had been working somewhat in parallel, as I think has come out in the testimony, that that had all been

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completed and they had come up with a final recommendation.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess the question that still lingers in my mind is, in the Navy we used to have an expression about going by the book, and I gather you were going by the book. But doesn't the process require some judgment?

Don't you have to use common sense? Wouldn't common sense require that you tell the decisionmakers about this serious problem that was different from anything in the past?

MR. REINARTZ: In looking at that one, Mr. Chairman, together with Mr. Mulloy when we looked at were there any launch commits, any Level II, as I perceived during the telecon, I got no disagreement concerning the Thiokol launch between any of the Level III elements, the contractor, with Mr. McDonald there.

I felt that the Thiokol and Marshall people had fully examined that concern, and that it had been satisfactorily dispositioned based upon the evidence and the data that was supplied to that decision process on that evening, from that material, and not extraneous to what else may have been going on within Thiokol that I had no knowledge of.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Thank you. I'm sorry

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for the long interruption.

MR. REINARTZ: Based upon- and as we skipped over, it is only a point to illustrate, Mr. Chairman, that in our discussion about the parachute with KSC and Mr. Aldrich, was to indicate that there was a clear area there where we had a very direct responsibility to inform them of the situation, which Mr. Mulloy did. And after a discussion of that issue, Mr. Aldrich concluded that the launch should proceed in that nature.

Based on the results of the meeting and the conclusions out of the meeting, Mr. Mulloy and I informed the director of Marshall, Dr. Lucas, and the director of science and engineering, Mr. Kingsbury, on the 28th of January about 5:00 of the initial Thiokol concerns and engineering recommendations, the final Thiokol launch recommendation, and the full support of the Marshall engineering for the launch recommendation, that I felt had led to a successful resolution of this concern.

[918] GENERAL KUTYNA: Could I interrupt for a minute? You informed Dr. Lucas. He is not in the reporting chain?

MR. REINARTZ: No, air.

GENERAL KUTYNA: If I could use an analogy, if you want to report a fire you don't go to the mayor.

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In his position as center director, Dr. Lucas was cut out of the reporting chain, much like a mayor. If it was important enough to report to him, why didn't you go through the fire department and go up your decision chain?

MR. REINARTZ: That, General Kutyna, is a normal course of our operating mode within the center, that I keep Dr. Lucas informed of my activities, be they this type of thing or other,

GENERAL KUTYNA: But you did that at 5 o'clock in the morning. That's kind of early. It would seem that's important.

Why didn't you go up the chain?

MR. REINARTZ: No, air. That is the time when we go in, basically go into the launch, and so it was not waking him up to tell him that information. It was when we go into the launch in the morning.

And based upon my assessment of the situation as dispositioned that evening, for better or worse, I did not perceive any clear requirement for interaction with Level II, as the concern was worked and dispositioned with full agreement among all responsible parties as to that agreement.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did I understand what you just said, that you told Dr. Lucas that all the

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engineers at Thiokol were in accord?

MR. REINARTZ: No, air. What I told him was of the initial Thiokol concerns that we had and the initial recommendation and the final Thiokol recommendation and the rationale associated with that recommendation, and the fact that we had the full support of the senior Marshall engineering and, as George has testified, to the extensiveness of the group of people we had involved in that telecon with the various disciplines, that those three elements made up the final recommendation.

MR. HOTZ: Mr. Reinartz, are you telling us that you in fact are the person who made the decision not to escalate this to a Level II item?

MR. REINARTZ: That is correct, air.

MR. HOTZ: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you think the system should be changed now? Do you think that this Commission should make a recommendation to correct that what appears to be inadequacy.?

MR. REINARTZ: I would not give a very quick, off-the-cuff answer to that, Mr. Chairman. I would like the opportunity to study that question some before I would recommend any major changes to the system.

DR. RIDE: Did you discuss with Dr. Lucas at

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all the possibility of reporting it to Arnie Aldrich?

MR. REINARTZ: No, ma'am, I did not.

DR. RIDE: Did anyone recommend to you that you report it to Mr. Aldrich?

MR. REINARTZ: No, Dr. Ride, they did not.

[919] DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, can I follow up on that?

Mr. Lovingood, in your personal notes provided to the committee, you indicated that you told Mr. Reinartz to advise Aldrich of the conference. Can you tell us exactly what you told him?

DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes, I think the way Stan just answered that question, I didn't advise Stan after the 8:45 Eastern Time telecon to advise Mr. Aldrich. When we terminated the telecon, Stan and I didn't talk any more. When we had the early evening telecon, that began at, I think it was, 4:45 Huntsville time-

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which day?

DR. LOVINGOOD: On the 27th.

Then everybody has mentioned that we had a bad hookup. We had people at home and we didn't have the charts there so that we could clearly follow the data. I probably could hear better than anybody, because I was in my office and I had a good tie-in with Wasatch.

And on the basis of that discussion, I felt

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like we were probably approaching a launch delay, and that is why I suggested then on that loop that we plan to have a later meeting, and we needed to get the charts in there so we could sit down and carefully go through all the data and assess it.

After completing that telecon and then making-and everyone agreeing to meet at certain locations and have the subsequent telecon that evening, I called Stan at the motel and I suggested to him that he go ahead and alert Arnie at that point.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: "Arnie" being?.

DR. LOVINGOOD: Arnie Aldrich. At that point that we were having the meeting, and that we were going to get together within the center and decide what to do, and then prepare Arnie for getting Level I together and then going on up the line.

But what I was looking at then was, I was thinking that there was a good possibility of a launch delay.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Of a what?

DR. LOVINGOOD: Of a launch delay.

Now, I never told Stan, if we don't delay the launch then go to Arnie. I never made that recommendation to him. I made the recommendation at the time it appeared to me that we were coming up on a

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delay.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Reinartz, do you remember him advising you that you let Mr. Aldrich know?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir, earlier in the evening. As he indicated, on the telecon at that time I had felt, as he indicated, we had had a very poor communication, we did not have a good understanding of the situation, and I felt it was necessary, Mr. Chairman, to get a full and complete understanding of the situation, and would proceed from there.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I was addressing my question to whether you remember being advised to let Mr. Aldrich know, and if so why didn't you let him know?

MR. REINARTZ: As I indicated, I felt that we needed- that we did not have a full understanding of the situation as I understood it at that time, and felt that was appropriate to do before we involved the Level II into the system.

So I guess, in my brief conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that from the viewpoint as a participant in that January 27th telecon, I believed that the total Thiokol and Marshall teams performed in a responsible manner, based upon the knowledge that I had, in the

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continuation of the dedicated professional approach by which these issues involving the space shuttle are addressed and resolved through an engineering and managerial assessment of the data to determine if the vehicle was ready and safe to fly.

I believe the process was appropriate and that the concern was dispositioned in the proper manner. I did not perceive, nor did I personally exert, any pressure on Thiokol. I stayed basically out of the telecon, as a listener, trying to discern the situation, and did not believe that I was exerting pressure on Thiokol.

Now, I might say, Mr. Chairman, that in light of your question, in hindsight it may have been better to inform Level II of the decisions, since they would- however, since they would only know what we knew from our side of the loop, it is sort of speculative on my part to consider what they would have done with the data that we had reported, considering at that point in time we had a final launch recommendation from the contractor and the concurrence by the Marshall engineering people. That would be the normal checkpoints that would be asked by Level II in the event of some discussion of a decision.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess you realize that

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this morning we had testimony to the effect that, from Mr. Hardy, that had he known that all of the engineers at Thiokol were still opposed to the launch, that his decision might have been different. In fact, I think he said it would have been different.

So there again, it seems to me at least that there was a failure of the process. And you relied on the telefax from Mr. Kilminster, and Mr. Hardy and others didn't realize that all the engineers at Thiokol were against the launch even then. So that that information never got to you and it never got to Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich.

MR. REINARTZ: You are correct, Mr. Chairman, and I think the question that you raised, be it for this issue or many others, will be the question relating to internal processes used within the contractors or within government agencies by which a final decision is arrived at. And I think that is entirely appropriate.

DR. RIDE: Did you appreciate that this was a Criticality 1 system that was being discussed?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, Dr. Ride, I did.

MR. SUTTER: When you get ready to launch you've got to look at the main power plants, the tank, the whole system. But did NASA perceive that this joint maybe was sub-marginal compared to the rest of the

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system, or did you assume it was business as usual?

MR. REINARTZ: No, sir. I think that how I would like to answer that is, within the total shuttle system there are a number of issues and problems with hardware being worked at any one time, and we had some that were being worked across the board in engines, and this one

MR. SUTTER: But not as critical as this item?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir, we have items that represent single point failures across the system. As Mr. Mulloy indicated, there is a number in his. There is a substantial number.

MR. SUTTER: And are there changes that are anticipated to bring them up to a better level, like the joint?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir. There are capability improvements that are going on in all of our systems at this point in time.

MR. SUTTER: Capability improvements?

[921] MR. REINARTZ: That would improve- excuse me. Let me say, that would improve their safety margins, are going on at this time.

MR. SUTTER: I would like to see a list of what those items are and prioritize them, and where

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would that joint be on that list?

MR. REINARTZ: I could give you a list. It would be after the fact, any prioritizing I would do, Mr. Sutter.

MR. SUTTER: Well, the reason I ask that question is that when you listen to Thiokol they really gave me the impression that that joint was in serious difficulty, and they mentioned the two meetings and they mentioned the short-term and the middle-term and the long-term changes.

And some of their engineers expressed- well, you read their letters now. Maybe they never showed them to you. But again, is there a communication gap, with one engineering department saying it is okay and another one saying we've got great concerns?

I still think, if there was a total communications system going on, anybody that would be facing that situation would have a tough time saying go. And so I really think there is a serious communication and management problem here.

MR. REINARTZ: During the discussion from the August time frame, Mr. Sutter, the discussions continued for each one of the launches that were associated from that time frame. And the Thiokol personnel- and I do not know at what point that stopped or started

1689

presented to the system, to Marshall, to headquarters, and all the rest of the system, the fact that that booster as it existed was completely safe and reliable for launching while these concerns about O-rings were being worked in a parallel fashion.

MR. SUTTER: Well, I may be Monday morning quarterbacking, but the way I read the Thiokol engineers, they knew of these concerns in the joint, and the Priority 1, the 1R and the blow-by, and I really think that they were getting themselves in a position where they suddenly got to a point where they now were outside of the area where they had the experience, and they just sort of said enough was enough.

They built up a real concern themselves, and I'm surprised they didn't build up that same concern in the engineers at NASA.

MR. REINARTZ: Going back in hindsight, Mr. Sutter, I'm surprised that the day before, where we were scheduled to launch and it was in the approximately 40 degrees, Thiokol raised no issue regarding O-ring temperature joints.

MR. SUTTER: It seems there's a communications gap here.

MR. REINARTZ: I just said that I was surprised in hindsight that they had not raised that, in

1690

light of the subsequent discussions of Monday evening.

DR. WALKER: Mr. Reinartz, I would like to understand your analysis of the technical issues. Mr. Hardy has stated that in his view perhaps the major cause of blow-by were imperfections in the seals and the sealing surfaces, and I think that that may very well be the case. There are certainly strong reasons to think that.

Did you in fact also think that and therefore feel that temperature was really not a significant parameter?

[922] MR. REINARTZ: Dr. Walker, you've had several O-ring experts and other people that have spent their careers in detailed engineering activities. I do not qualify myself as a seal expert, but I listened very carefully to the reasons and the rationale that was generated during the course of that discussion and during Mr. Hardy's comments and discussion, and relied very heavily on the combination of the contractor's recommendation and the engineering recommendation of the people that I have worked with for many years.

DR. WALKER: But did you have an opinion as to why Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy did not agree that temperature was a very important parameter? I mean, that was really the crux of the matter.

1691

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir, I did have an opinion m that, and the fact that, based upon the range at which blow-by had occurred on the various motors and flight experience, and based upon the fact that it appeared from that data that there was not a correlation with temperature and the incipient blow-by, and the whole point of our evening discussion, that we were- a narrow issue that Thiokol raised that evening to discuss was the question of whether or not the primary ring would take longer to seat and therefore increase the risk of blow-by, the longer seating being from the cold temperature.

And during that, that was a possibility that Thiokol and ourselves had acknowledged. The condition of blow-by was a condition that had been acknowledged for the past year in all the flight readiness reviews, that that was a possibility that could occur.

DR. WALKER: Let's suppose that Thiokol was incorrect and that temperature was not really an important parameter. Did you feel that you wanted to understand this situation and therefore develop an alternative theory which would explain the blow-by data?

And presumably, Mr. Hardy had done that in his own mind. He was convinced imperfections and other

1692

sorts of- imperfections and the nicks and what have you in the surfaces were the real cause. Did you inquire or ask for that analysis so that you would understand why the Thiokol analysis was an incorrect one, or at least incorrect in the opinion of Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy?

MR. REINARTZ: I think, Dr. Walker, that the discussion as I understood was centered around the ability of the primary O-ring to seal and that blow-by might occur in the timing. I think Mr. Hardy, where he talked about the effects, said there could be several reasons why you might be able to lose, I think, in response to a proposed failure scenario that was suggested about the black puff of smoke, saying that there could be other things that might have caused a defectiveness on the ring, that it was not just temperature-originated.

And those other defects, yes, sir, I was aware that there could be possible other defects that might cause that.

DR. WALKER: So were you satisfied, then, that there was enough understanding of the causes of blow-by so that you weren't really concerned and you were able to feel that the temperature problem raised by Thiokol could be laid to rest because you understood what was

1693

going on well enough to know that that temperature concern was really not a legitimate one? MR. REINARTZ: The conclusion that the temperature was not a major factor and that we would not see increased launch risk as a result of that, yes, sir, that was my conclusion.

DR. KEEL: Mr. Lovingood, you were the one who was actually contacted by the resident manager of Marshall at Kennedy to set up the early afternoon telecon, is that right?

[923] DR. LOVINGOOD: That's correct.

DR. KEEL: And then you and Mr. Reinartz both participated in that early afternoon teleconference?

DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes. Stan was in the motel.

DR. KEEL: But Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy did not?

DR. LOVINGOOD: Mr. Hardy was at home and had a very bad connection. In fact, a lot of what I did in that telecon was I was trying to relay information from what was being said at Wasatch to Hardy, and then what Hardy said back to Wasatch guys.

DR. KEEL: So Hardy was on it, but had a poor connection?

DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes, he had a very bad

1694

connection.

DR. KEEL: And Mr. Mulloy was not on it?

DR. LOVINGOOD: That is correct.

DR. KEEL: You just indicated earlier that, based upon that teleconference, you thought there was a good possibility of delay. Is that what Thiokol was recommending then, was delay?

DR. LOVINGOOD: That is the way I heard it, and they were talking about the 51-C experience and the fact that they had experienced the worst. case blow-by as far as the arc and the soot and so forth. And also, they talked about the resiliency data that they had.

So it appeared to me- and we didn't have all of the proper people there. That was another aspect of this. It appeared to me that we had better sit down and get the data so that we could understand exactly what they were talking about and assess that data.

And that is why I suggested that we go ahead and have a telecon within the center, so that we could review that.

DR. KEEL: So as early as after that first afternoon conference at 5:45, it appeared that Thiokol was basically saying delay; is that right?

DR. LOVINGOOD: That is the way it came across to me. I don't know how other people perceived it, but

1695

that's the way it came across to me.

DR. KEEL: Mr. Reinartz, how did you perceive it?

MR. REINARTZ: I did not perceive it that way. I perceived that they were raising some questions and issues which required looking into by all the right parties, but I did not perceive it as a recommendation to delay.

DR. KEEL: Some prospects for delay?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, sir, that possibility is always there.

DR. KEEL: Did you convey that to Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy before the 8:15 conference?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, I did. And as a matter of fact, we had a discussion. Mr. Mulloy was just out of communication for about an hour, and then after that I got in contact with him and we both had a short discussion relating to the general nature of the concerns with Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury at the motel before we both departed for the telecon that we had set up out at the Cape.

DR. KEEL: But based upon that, Mr. Lovingood, that impression, you thought it was a significant enough possibility that Mr. Aldrich should have been contacted?

[924] 1696

DR. KEEL: In addition, did you recommend that Mr. Lucas, who is director of Marshall, of course, and Mr. Kingsbury, who is Mr. Hardy's boss, participate in the 8:15 conference?

DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes, I did.

DR. KEEL: And you recommended that to whom?

DR. LOVINGOOD: I believe I said that over the net. I said that I thought we ought to have an inter-center meeting involving Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury, and then plan to go on up the line to Level II and Level I.

And then it was after we broke off that first telecon I called Stan at the motel and told him that he ought to go ahead and alert Arnie to that possibility.

DR. KEEL: And Mr. Reinartz, you then visited the motel room of Mr. Lucas with Mr. Kingsbury, and also was Mr. Mulloy with you then?

MR. REINARTZ: Yes, he was, sir. In the first couple of minutes I believe I was there by myself, and then Mr. Mulloy joined us.

DR. KEEL: And did you discuss with them Mr. Lovingood's recommendation that the two of them, Lucas and Kingsbury, participate?

MR. REINARTZ: No, sir. I don't recall

1697

discussing Mr. Lovingood's recommendations. I discussed with them the nature of the telecon, the nature of the concerns raised by Thiokol, and the plans to gather the proper technical support people at Marshall for examination of the data.

And I believe that was the essence of the discussion.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you didn't recommend that the information be given to Level II or Level I?

MR. REINARTZ: I don't recall that I raised that issue with Dr. Lucas. I told him what the plans were for proceeding. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, making any statement regarding that.

1698

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Lovingood and Mr. Reinartz.

DR. LOVINGOOD: Sir, could I make a brief statement concerning the telecon?

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sure.

DR. LOVINGOOD: I would like to read this into the record to give my point of view of the 8:30 telecon.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, please do, and I didn't realize that you had something you wanted to submit, but go right ahead.

DR. LOVINGOOD: I did not perceive during the discussion of January 27 anyone demanding or even requesting that Morton Thiokol prove to NASA that it was not safe to fly. The presentation by Morton Thiokol was intended to convey data relating to the effect low temperatures might have on the O-rings sealing, and the ensuing discussions were perceived by me to be an attempt to understand precisely what they were saying. This approach is characteristic of all NASA-contractor discussions, regardless of the nature of the issue or the nature of the data being presented.

As Mr. Mulloy has testified, we had previously established a rationale for safe flight in the light of O-ring erosion and blow-by. I was listening intently to

[925] 1699

the discussions to determine if the data presented that night altered that rationale. However, the bottom line had to be the following. If the decision was made to fly, a rationale for safe flight, including the new information we had, would have to be stated and assessed. I believe it was a consensus among NASA personnel involved, and certainly it was my position, that if Morton Thiokol recommended we not launch, we should not launch.

The rationale for safe flight was stated over the network by Mr. Mulloy, as he has testified. After Morton Thiokol made their recommendation not to fly, Mr. Hardy supported Mulloy and stated why, and of course, he has testified to that, why in his opinion the rationale was still valid in light of the MTI data. There was no pressure on MTI to change their recommendation. After Mulloy and Hardy had spoken, Mr. Reinartz, in what I perceived to be a very polite tone of voice, asked Joe Kilminster if he wanted to respond to Mulloy's and Hardy's comments. At this time Kilminster asked for the five-minute caucus.

After the caucus, Kilminster presented the MTI recommendation to launch. I understood the MTI position being that even if the data concerning cold temp effects on the O-rings were correct, the risk of a slow primary

1700

O-ring was increased, but the risk was not substantially different from STS 51-C. The key to the rationale for safe flight was that if the primary ring experienced blow-by during ignition, the secondary seal would experience the pressure and would seal prior to joint rotation, and that has been elaborated on quite a bit, I think.

MR. SUTTER: There is a waiver saying don't depend on the secondary seal. Within all the NASA ground rules for launch, how could you accept that rationale?

DR. LOVINGOOD: Excuse me, sir. Let me try to explain the way I understand that waiver, and there have been a lot of people doing that.

The waiver says there are two conditions you have to have before you don't have redundancy. One of them is what I call a spatial condition which says that the dimensional tolerances have to be such that you get a bad stackup, you don't have proper squeeze, etc., on the O-ring, so that when you get joint rotation, you will lift the metal surfaces off the O-ring. All right, that's the one condition, and that is a worst case condition involving dimensional tolerances.

The other condition is a temporal condition which says that you have to be past the point of joint

1701

rotation, and of course, that relates back to what I just said, the joint has to rotate.

So first of all, if you don't have this bad stackup, then you have full redundancy. Now, secondly, if you do have the bad stackup, you have redundancy during the ignition transient up to the 170 millisecond point or 300 millisecond point, whatever it is, but that is the way I understand the CIL.

MR. SUTTER: That is not what I understand a waiver means.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Go ahead.

DR. LOVINGOOD: I would like to emphasize that in my opinion NASA was asking itself and MTI whether there was any reason not to expect a safe flight. As far as I was aware at the time, everyone concluded that it was safe to proceed.

Now, I would like to add to that: I would like to respond to the question that you asked Mr. Reinartz; concerning would I have concluded at the end of the first, at the caucus, at the beginning of the caucus, would I have concluded that the recommendation by Thiokol engineering [926] was unanimous? I would not have. I have been working for NASA almost 24 years, and I have seen many occasions where there have been differences within our own engineering within

1702

NASA. I was in engineering. I was in Science and Engineering for 18 years before coming to the project office; many occasions where there have been differences of opinion looking at the same data, different conclusions. I have seen differences between contractors, and in particular, I worked very closely with Rocketdyne as Engine Project Manager, and I have seen many occasions where the Rocketdyne engineers and the NASA engineers looked at the same data and reached different conclusions.

So in fact, since Thiokol was recommending not to launch, I would not have concluded that their engineering was unanimously opposed to launch. On the other hand, when they came back to launch, perhaps incorrectly I concluded that they were all for it, that it was unanimous. I had no reason to believe otherwise. And I never did know that they weren't unanimous until after the launch.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, thank you very much.

Unless there are questions, we appreciate it.

DR . KEEL: If we could have Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Davis and Colonel Kolczynski.

(Witnesses sworn.)

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, we understand that you three have been designated or were designated

1703

as the Ice Team that worked at Kennedy Space Center, and worked in connection with the launch of the Challenger.

Would you give the Commission some knowledge about yourselves and how you operated, and then tell us in narrative form what happened on the day- well, on the 27th and 28th, if you will. Did you start working on the 28th on this or did you work on the 27th, too?

[Please note that some of the titles to the references listed below do not appear in the original text. Titles are included to identify and clarify the linked references- Chris Gamble, html editor]

[927] [Ref. 2/26-7 1 of 5] Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident- by S.R. Reinartz, February 25, 1986.

[928] [Ref. 2/26-7 2 of 5] Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident- by S.R. Reinartz, February 25, 1986. (continued)

[929] [Ref. 2/26-7 3 of 5] Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident- by S.R. Reinartz, February 25, 1986. (continued)

[930] [Ref. 2/26-7 4 of 5] Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident- by S.R. Reinartz, February 25, 1986. (continued)

[931] [Ref. 2/26-7 5 of 5] Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident- by S.R. Reinartz, February 25, 1986. (continued)

[932] [Ref. 2/26-8 1 of 12] NASA note to James Harrington from Judson A. Lovingood; subject: personal documentation; Date: February 20, 1986.

[933] [Ref. 2/26-8 2 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Recollection of Chronological Events from January 27, 1986.

[934] [Ref. 2/26-8 3 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Recollection of Chronological Events from January 27, 1986. (continued).

[935] [Ref. 2/26-8 4 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Recollection of Chronological Events from January 27, 1986. (continued).

[936] [Ref. 2/26-8 5 of 12] Organization Chart: George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.

[937] [Ref. 2/26-8 6 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Handwritten Notes from 4:45 p.m. CST, January 27, 1986, telecon.

[938] [Ref. 2/26-8 7 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Handwritten Notes from 4:45 p.m. CST, January 27, 1986, telecon. (continued)

[939] [Ref. 2/26-8 8 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Handwritten Notes: Conclusion Chart presented at approximately 7:45 p.m. CST telecon.

[940] [Ref. 2/26-8 9 of 12] Handwritten notes: Recommendation made by MTI (Morton Thiokol Inc.) prior to their caucus.

[941] [Ref. 2/26-8 10 of 12] MTI (Morton Thiokol Inc.) Assessment of Temperature Concern on SRM-25 (51-L) Launch. Signed: Joe Kilminster.

[942] [Ref. 2/26-8 11 of 12] NASA Memo: To Memorandum for Record from J.A. Lovingood; Subject: Meetings on January 27, 1986, Regarding Low Temperature Effect on SRM O-Ring.

[943] [Ref. 2/26-8 12 of 12] NASA Memo: To Memorandum for Record from J.A. Lovingood; Subject: Meetings on January 27, 1986, Regarding Low Temperature Effect on SRM O-Ring. (continued)

[Editor's note: the referenced links below are the same as the ones above!]

[944] [Ref. 2/26-7 1 of 5] [Ref. 2/26-7 1 of 5] Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident- by S.R. Reinartz, February 25, 1986. [Ref. 2/26-7 2 of 5] idem. (continued)

[945] [Ref. 2/26-7 3 of 5] idem. (continued) [Ref. 2/26-7 4 of 5] idem. (continued)

[946] [Ref. 2/26-7 5 of 5] idem. (continued)

[947] [Ref. 2/26-8 1 of 12] NASA note to James Harrington from Judson A. Lovingood; subject: personal documentation; Date: February 20, 1986.

[948] [Ref. 2/26-8 2 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Recollection of Chronological Events from January 27, 1986.

[949] [Ref. 2/26-8 3 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Recollection of Chronological Events from January 27, 1986. (continued).

[950] [Ref. 2/26-8 4 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Recollection of Chronological Events from January 27, 1986. (continued). [Ref. 2/26-8 5 of 12] Organization Chart: George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.

[951] [Ref. 2/26-8 6 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Handwritten Notes from 4:45 p.m. CST, January 27, 1986, telecon.

[952] [Ref. 2/26-8 7 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Handwritten Notes from 4:45 p.m. CST, January 27, 1986, telecon. (continued) [Ref. 2/26-8 8 of 12] J.A. Lovingood's Handwritten Notes: Conclusion Chart presented at approximately 7:45 p.m. CST telecon.

[953] [Ref. 2/26-8 9 of 12] Handwritten notes: Recommendation made by MTI (Morton Thiokol Inc.) prior to their caucus. [Ref. 2/26-8 10 of 12] MTI (Morton Thiokol Inc.) Assessment of Temperature Concern on SRM-25 (51-L) Launch. Signed: Joe Kilminster.

[954] [Ref. 2/26-8 11 of 12] NASA Memo: To Memorandum for Record from J.A. Lovingood; Subject: Meetings on January 27, 1986, Regarding Low Temperature Effect on SRM O-Ring. [Ref. 2/26-8 12 of 12] NASA Memo: To Memorandum for Record from J.A. Lovingood; Subject: Meetings on January 27, 1986, Regarding Low Temperature Effect on SRM O-Ring. (continued)

[955] 1704

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES STEVENSON, AND B. K. DAVIS, ICE TEAM MEMBERS, AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD F. KOLCZYNSKI, COMMANDER, DETACHMENT 11, 2d WEATHER SQUADRON, PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE

MR. STEVENSON: We did it both days.

Okay, I am Charles Stevenson, and I have been employed by NASA at the Kennedy Space Center since 1965. During the past 20 years I have been a member of the test checkout and launch team for all manned space flights.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you move the mike over a little bit?

MR. STEVENSON: Starting with the Gemini program and running through Apollo and into the Shuttle program. I am a graduate of North Carolina State University, and I have a degree in engineering mechanics, a B.S. degree, and a B.S. degree also in physics and applied mathematics. I am currently the section chief for the external tank and the solid rocket booster mechanical systems section.

In regards to the questions I am anticipating, I am also responsible for TPS, ice, frost and debris damage on the Shuttle.

MR. DAVIS: I am Billy K. Davis. I have been

[956] 1705

with NASA since 1960. I have a degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Alabama, and I started in the manufacturing/engineering area for Marshall Space Flight Center, and then systems engineering, and post that, I have been in the Chief Engineering Office for the External Tank, and in that area, I have been responsible for development of the manufacturing processes, the facilities and the other things that go with the external tank insulation system, and as a part of that, was instrumental in seeing to it that we got a development that could provide us with knowledge as to whether or not we would make ice, and at what time we would have ice, and how we could detect it.

And so, for that reason, for each launch I have been the senior test representative for the external tank and work with Mr. Stevenson in the ice and debris area.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Colonel Kolczynski, I think I mislabeled you as a member of the ice team. I understand that you are the Air Force weatherman, is that correct?

COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: Yes, sir, that is true.

I am Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Kolczynski. I am Commander of Detachment 11, 2d Weather Squadron at Patrick Air Force Base. In that capacity, I provide

1706

support to the Eastern Test Range, Eastern Space and Missile Center, Air Force Tactical Applications, and then, of course, to NASA in support of all Shuttle operations up to and including launch.

My expertise is I have been in the Air Force 19 1/2 years, and for 18 1/2 of those years I have been a meteorologist. I have a bachelor's degree in mathematics, a master's degree from Texas A&M in meteorology, and I've got some doctoral work at the University of Maryland, also in meteorology. My experience has been as a forecaster at Grand Forks Air Force Base for my early days in the Air Force, then as a staff meteorologist consulting on weather support to developing systems like the F-15 and the A-10 aircraft at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. I worked at Studies and Analysis in the Pentagon in operations research doing force deployment issues, trade-off analyses and simulations. And of course, at Headquarters, Air Weather Service

at Studies and Analyses. And classified Special Projects. And finally a year at the Kennedy Space Center.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.

Mr. Stevenson, would you proceed? Do you have a statement or do you want to proceed to just narrate what happened on those two days?

1707

MR. STEVENSON: Okay, let me-I will do both.

As a TPS ice, frost and debris team we have really seven major activities, and I would just name the seven, and then I will get into the ones we are really interested in.

We initially do a pre-launch pad debris and vehicle familiarization walkdown to familiarize all the people with the possibilities of debris issues and to familiarize them with the latest configuration of the vehicle. That is for the advantage of some of the people who normally do not work the vehicle every day but come to us from off-Center.

We then conduct during the launch a T-3 hour ice/frost walkdown where again we look at the vehicle for ice/frost conditions, TPS anomalies, and any last minute debris that we may find.

Following launch, we immediately go to the pad again and do a postlaunch debris assessment. The purpose of this mainly is to determine if there is any flight hardware on the pad or any damage that may have occurred to the vehicle as a result of some pad debris.

[957] We then do a postflight photo analysis in which we again look at the vehicle, that is, as it is launched through the launch film, to see if there is any

1708

damage to the vehicle. We also review the SRB for postflight debris assessment, and we review the orbiter once it returns.

In regards to the launch day activities, I guess I should just read a statement.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.

MR. STEVENSON: The members of the ice/frost team made three assessments of the icing conditions on the FSS, the RSS, the MLP deck and Pad B apron during the STS-33 prelaunch activities. Due to a drop in temperatures to below freezing during the preceding day and night, the freeze protection plan last used for STS-20 on January 24, 1985 was implemented to protect the various facility systems.

Two actions within the plan were intended to limit the ice debris which could potentially cause damage to the Shuttle vehicle during the launch. The first action involved adding 1450 gallons of antifreeze into the over-pressure water troughs.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which day now are you speaking about, please?

MR. STEVENSON: I am talking about launch day.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: January 28, launch day?

MR. STEVENSON: Yes.

1709

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If you would speak a little bit more into the mike, I have just a bit of trouble hearing you.

MR. STEVENSON: Okay. The water troughs in both SRB holds have a total capacity of 6,580 gallons. The resulting antifreeze to water ratio is calculated to be at approximately 21.3 percent, which protected the water troughs from freezing down to an ambient temperature of 16 degrees.

The second action involved the draining, where practical, of all water systems. Several systems, such as the fiex, the deluge, the emergency shower and eye wash were not drained. These systems were opened slightly and allowed to trickle into the drains. The trickling water was found to cause the drains to overflow, and the high wind gusts spread the water over large areas, and it then froze.

Based upon those conditions, when we came into the firing room on the day of launch and had a call to stations, the ice, frost, TPS and debris team observed the icing conditions which were on the FSS and notified our upper management. A decision was made at that time to send the ice/frost team to the pad for an assessment of the facility icing conditions.

The team arrived at the pad at approximately

1710

0130 in the morning and remained there for approximately one and one half hours.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And who was the team?

MR. STEVENSON: The team at this time consisted of B. K. Davis, myself, and two facility members who were familiar with the water system.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was that unusual to have you go to the pad at that time?

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, it is.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Had it ever been done before?

MR. STEVENSON: Once before when we had a similar condition.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Proceed.

[958] MR. STEVENSON: Okay.

Upon arrival at the pad we noted the following conditions, and I will just more or less summarize those.

As far as the pad apron was concerned, ice was concentrated in an area under the RSS and covered approximately 3,000 square feet. The ice ranged in thickness from one fourth of an inch to about three inches. On the MLP deck itself, we had a sheet of ice mostly on the west side between the left hand SRB exhaust holes and the west side, or the east side of the

1711

FSS.

This ice-the sheet ice was approximately one-eighth inch thick, and the secondary overpressure water troughs, we found that we had ice which was estimated to be approximately one half inch thick. And the density of that ice was estimated to be approximately 25 pounds per cubic foot.

As for the fixed service structure between the 100 and 220-foot levels, we had a large quantity of icicles which averaged approximately five-eighths inch in diameter and ranged from six inches to one foot long. We had ice on all panels, such as distribution panels, structural members of the facility, valve panels. This ice averaged approximately one-eighth to one-half inch thick.

Upon returning to the LCC, of course, we immediately held a meeting with our upper management, and members of the management system were probably Mr. Aldrich and Horace Lambreth, who is Director of Shuttle Engineering.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Aldrich and who else?

MR. STEVENSON: Horace Lambreth, Director of Shuttle Engineering, and several other key management people who I don't have the names of right off.

The results of that meeting was that we

1712

immediately started the engineering effort to calculate the trajectories of ice which would be falling off of the FSS. We concluded that the ice which we had seen in the water troughs, the overpressure troughs, would not be acceptable for launch based on our previous experience of debris coming out of the water troughs.

We decided to send a facility technician, group of technicians with us to the pad again when we went during our normal three-hour inspection, and we proceeded to make a second assessment during the T-3 hour hold on the conditions we found there, we left the LCC-

MR. HOTZ: What time did you go out on the pad the second time?

MR. STEVENSON: We arrived at the pad at 0654 in the morning, and we departed at 0844. Again, the team was augmented by several facility personnel to aid us in the removal of ice from the water troughs, which we had determined to be unacceptable for launch.

Our temperatures, our ambient temperatures as we recorded them on our consoles and found them during the time we were there ranged from 26.1 to 30.1 degrees Fahrenheit. The ice was found in the troughs to have thickened and was solid. These are the overpressure water troughs.

1713

A fish net was employed to break up the ice and remove it. Approximately 95 percent of the ice was removed using this method. The ice and unfrozen antifreeze solution was measured at that time with the infrared pyrometer and found to have a temperature between 8 degrees and 10 degrees Fahrenheit. Those temperatures have since been corrected to read between 14 and 16 [959] degrees. Also most of the icicles that we had seen or reported earlier on the left hand SRB aft skirt were removed during this period.

As far as the FSS goes, the ice had increased, but the overall extent of the ice was generally the same.

Upon returning to the LCC, we immediately held a second meeting with about the same members present. We had at that time completed our trajectory calculations which predicted that the ice falling from the FSS, if it fell at ignition, would probably impact the MLP deck at a distance of approximately 20 feet from the FSS. These calculations did not include the effects of aspiration, which was unknown.

We had decided in the meeting that if we had ice falling away from the vehicle, that aspiration would not draw ice into the water trough holes, and therefore, that the ice on the FSS was not a safety of flight

1714

issue.

We proceeded back to the pad for a third inspection, and the reason we went back for the third inspection-and this would not normally be an inspection we would conduct-was to remove all of the ice off of the MLP deck on the west side of the MLP deck, which would have a potential for getting-being drawn in by aspiration or by vibration of the deck.

MR. HOTZ: Could you give us the times on that again?

MR. STEVENSON: That time was between 10:30 and approximately 11:00 a.m. We again carried the facility crew with us who aided us in the removal of all of the ice on the west part of the MLP deck away from the left hand SRB. The conditions of the ambient temperatures, as measured in the firing room, too, by our instrumentation for this period of time ranged from 34.8 to 36.2 degrees Fahrenheit. We also found that there was again a little bit of ice in the overpressure water troughs, and again, we fished that ice out, and we returned to the LCC at approximately T-20 minutes.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Your function was to make the inspections that you referred to and report back to Mr. Aldrich, is that it?

MR. STEVENSON: I report back normally to the

1715

launch director.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In this case, who was he?

MR. STEVENSON: In this case the launch director was Mr. Gene Thomas, but in our normal report we do it over the communications system, which also includes whatever top management.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But in this case who did you report to?

MR. STEVENSON: In this case, each time we held a special meeting off-line to discuss the ice issues and what we should be doing about it.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was that because it was a little worse than previous launches?

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did the low temperature readings cause any concern among the ice team members?

MR. STEVENSON: You mean our scanner readings?

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.

MR. STEVENSON: Well, we took a considerable amount of readings using the IR scanner. We normally take a lot of readings using the IR scanner. We are charged with the responsibility [960] of and use the IR scanner mainly to determine the temperatures on the ET skin because the ET surface is where we are really

1716

expecting ice, and the icing conditions, and that is really what we look for when we make an ice inspection is the ice that is normally on the tank that will cause damage to the orbiter during flight.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But in this case you did something more?

MR. STEVENSON: Well, we took the-in this case we took readings that we normally take. We take more readings than we are required to take, if that is your question.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you take readings on the SRBs?

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you normally do that?

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And were there differences in the readings between the left and the right booster?

MR. STEVENSON: Approximately 14 degrees delta.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what were those readings?

MR. STEVENSON: The uncorrected readings were 9 degrees and 23 degrees. We have since scaled those up to 19 degrees and 33 degrees.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So the right was 19 degrees,

1717

you think, and the left was 33 degrees?

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And was there any discussion about those readings with other members of the launch team?

MR. STEVENSON: With other members of the launch team, no, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what were those discussions?

MR. STEVENSON: We did not discuss those specific temperatures with other members of the launch team.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you report those temperatures to others?

MR. STEVENSON: No, sir, not those specific temperatures.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why not?

MR. STEVENSON: Because, in our opinion, first-well, two reasons, I guess. Number one, the vehicle was operating within the red lines that we have, the guidelines that we have to go by, and when we go out and make our inspection, we are required to report on anomalies, number one, and having no anomalies, you report on the points of interest.

Since the vehicle is operating within its red

1718

lines, within my guidelines, within its Launch Commit Criteria, within the OMRSD requirements, that was not a point to report.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, did I see you about to say something?

MR. DAVIS: Well, when you first asked the question earlier, did we discuss it among ourselves, Charlie and I did discuss it at the time and concluded that this 9-degree reading probably might not be exactly right, and felt that the set of readings that you get on the left-hand booster was more representative of what the true conditions were.

[961] As far as the temperature readings taken on the tank itself, they followed fairly close to the predictions that we had, although right at the bottom the temperature readings were somewhat further than normal away from the predicted readings. They were colder, but they were not so much colder that it would cause any particular consternation or anything because our insulation is quite capable of working at liquid hydrogen temperatures, and in fact, you can immerse it in liquid hydrogen and it really doesn't do anything to it other than it just takes a while for it to get cold in the middle.

So as far as the tank was concerned, and all

1719

of the things that it normally would be expected to do, it was doing it in fact better than usual because we had ice in smaller amounts in places that we normally had a lot of ice, like interfaces between the orbiter and the tank and the interface between the solids and the tank. They had ice in the regular places but it was and there are certain places where it is quite acceptable to have them. In this case we had much less than usual, and it can be attributed to the fact that there was no atmospheric moisture available to be forming on it.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, the icing conditions were not as bad on this flight as on others?

MR. DAVIS: That is correct.

MR. STEVENSON: As far as the vehicle is concerned.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As far as the vehicle is concerned.

MR. STEVENSON: Right.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about other aspects of the Shuttle?

MR. DAVIS: Do you mean like the orbiter?

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, everything else.

MR. DAVIS: Well, the temperatures, of course, were much colder than we have ever seen before. Some of the readings, like the temperature, for example, that I

1720

took on the side of the orbiter, were colder than I have ever seen, but the orbiter is quite capable of handling those kind of temperatures, too. In fact, if you leave the orbiter pointed in one direction during flight, it will get extremely cold if it is looking at the night sky. And so the actual readings that I got were not anything of any significance, but the fact that they were reading a low almost as cold as if it were on the side of the tank made me wonder if maybe I wasn't getting some effect from the night sky.

And so once we had recorded all of the data, I was prepared afterwards, you know, somebody would probably ask me whether those readings were really true or not, and all I could say at the time of the readings was that this was what the gun said, and it was possible then to go back and do something to find out what it really was, maybe.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You have talked about the orbiter and the external tank. You haven't mentioned the boosters.

MR. DAVIS: The booster, I have made a practice of measuring temperatures on the boosters simply because I had gotten into the habit of measuring the whole vehicle since other elements had asked for specific inputs because of changes that they were making

1721

or modifications or something, and so I said, why not make the record of the whole thing because, who knows, someday somebody might want to know, and somebody might be able to pick a trend out of it. And I've seen differences in temperature between the two boosters quite often.

[962] The sun makes an extreme difference, and like one time, 118 degrees on one side and about 84 on the other, a 34 degree difference. And this didn't cause any problems. It was just something that I noted.

We don't try to report the details because, first of all, if you look at this drawing that we will give you a copy of, you will see that there are no readings on the right hand booster above the lower end of it, simply because I am unable to reach it, and I can't take the normal reading. And so I cannot trust those readings at all.

I know that they give you odd readings when you have a glancing angle with the Omegascope or with the other IR gun that we have used in the past. So for that reason we have always concentrated on what the differences were at the bottom and then take a general view of the side of the SRB.

There was one difference, this time, too. We had ice for about 30 feet up the side of the left hand

1722

solid. We had a small amount of ice. This is at T-3 hour inspection point, on the left hand wing. By the time that we were back out there at T-20 minutes, the ice on the wing had melted off and was gone completely. The ice on the SRB was still solid and was in the shade.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that was the left?

MR. DAVIS: The left, yes, sir.

VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Glaze ice?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.

VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And what do you attribute the source of that to be?

MR. DAVIS: It came from the FSS, the wind blowing moisture off of the FSS and hitting the side of the SRB.

DR. RIDE: Is that the sort of thing that you would report to the launch director? Was that reported?

MR. DAVIS: We did report that, yes, ma'am.

DR. COVERT: Did you have any idea what that ice weighed?

MR. DAVIS: Do you mean its density?

DR. COVERT: No, how much additional weight was on the vehicle due to the ice?

MR. DAVIS: It was about an eighth of an inch thick from what I could observe. So it couldn't have

1723

weighed very much, maybe 25 pounds or so.

DR. COVERT: Thank you.

MR. RUMMEL: In your opinion, would any propellant leaks in the ET have showed up on the infrared scanner?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, they would have particularly in that I was looking at a small, let's see, rhombus shaped area that had a little bit more frost on it than the others in this general vicinity that everybody is now seeing the puff of smoke in, and at the time that I was taking a reading of that, which by the way, read minus 20, but I knew that it was a thin place, and we talked among ourselves about what was that representative of and concluded what did it, and there are other places on it, is where a gun is spraying insulation on will either slow down or else it will stop, and you pick a new gun up, and we have it built so that you have a redundancy in the operation. And so that was a slightly thinner place than in the other places, and you would expect it to be cold. And I took a scan in that general area on the tank. If we had had a hydrogen leak, it would have gone off scale.

[963] In fact, if I look at the overboard bleed on the engines, it goes off scale.

MR. RUMMEL: I take it, then, you are fairly

1724

satisfied that no leak was apparent at that time?

Was this scan coverage quite complete do you think?

MR. DAVIS: Well, in the area of the question as far as the smoke is concerned, it was very, very well covered because of this little anomaly that I was looking at there.

MR. RUMMEL: I didn't intend to limit the question to that area.

Did you see anything anywhere in the tank, or were you able to look at other places?

MR. DAVIS: I make a habit of taking a scan at the interface between the orbiter and the ET on both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen connection points, and if we had had a liquid hydrogen leak there, I would have seen it. We would have gone off scale then. If we had had an oxygen leak on the other side, I would have seen it, and it would have gone off scale.

VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I understand you take that through optics? Is that measurement taken through optics?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir. The IR gun is a thing that in this particular case the one we are using is an Omegascope, and it is a pistol grip type gun with a telescopic sight on it, and it actually looks through

1725

the center line of the view so that what you see in the scope is what you are actually measuring the temperature of.

VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And what percentage of the total vehicle are you able to scan?

MR. DAVIS: Well, I can answer that two ways. I can probably make a scan of about 40 percent of it, but I would say that we probably don't look at more than 10 percent.

MR. RUMMEL: Are those readings recorded?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, they are.

MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.

MR. ACHESON: Is it a fact that that infrared gun must be exposed t') the operating temperature for some length of time before it is accurate?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir. In fact, that's the reason for the corrections we made in the temperature readings. We were lucky in that we have a very good time line that we keep of when we leave where and what we do in between times, and we: were able to reconstruct which-and I knew which one of the readings were taken first because I have set up a sort of an operating sequence that I always follow to try to keep from forgetting anything. And so we could account for within a minute or so when every reading was made, and then run

1726

the IR gun through a test chamber which we have set up to run at, say, 24 degrees, and watch it come down, and keep a record of every minute as we went through, and we were able to reconstruct the necessary corrections on it.

And one of the things that we felt we had to do on the correction on it was to have the correction come out and match the water trough temperatures because we knew that the water in there had to melt at 16 degrees and it had to be solid at something below that, and an antifreeze solution is like solder in that it has to cool off. It is not like just plain pure water that would go from a liquid to a solid at the same temperature. It has to be colder.

[964] And so the readings that I got from the solidly-frozen areas were in the 8-degree range, and the ones that had some water that I was looking at with the antifreeze solution in it were at 10 degrees. And so I just went through the timing and let the other gentlemen that ran the calibration tests for us give me the corrections, and I simply added them to it, and it came out that the cold ice part was 14 degrees and the melting part was 16 degrees, and we felt that that kind of pegged it pretty close to what was real.

1727

VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: After you applied all of the corrections to the readings of the Omegascope and so on, what do you conclude the actual temperatures of the SRB skirt and so on were now?

MR. DAVIS: For the skirt-and I would like to talk about that just a little bit, but I will go ahead and give you the numbers first. The skirt corrects to 16 degrees; the solid motor case on-and this is on the right hand, to 19 degrees. Now, the left hand at the 95-foot or the 100-foot level, as they call it over on Pad B, corrected to 33 for the solid motor case and 36 for the aft skirt. And in looking back at pictures of the area-and we, by the way, also take representative pictures of different angles of this-there is a light television camera set that they follow us around while we are out there and try to keep up with what we are doing, and it was shining at the same time I was making the measurements on this area, and I am sure that we were getting some moisture from the leaking area behind us, and I believe I was reading water that was in the process of freezing and seeing some reflections of the lights in it so that we got, I believe, a slightly erroneous reading on the 23 and 25 degrees.

And the correction, then, is as erroneous as it was originally, and so it probably was on the order

1728

of the temperatures that we got up higher, like 28, 29, maybe 30 degrees at the bottom. And as I was about to say earlier, the skirt on the right hand booster was colder than the solids for two reasons. One is that it has a better night sky view angle, and another is that it is insulated on the inside, and it is a relatively thin skinned material whereas the insulation and other material inside the solid motor itself has got a much lower-I mean a much higher heat transfer capability than the insulation on the inside of the skirt.

VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Was the night sky you were looking at, was it a cloudy sky.?

MR. DAVIS: No, sir, it was absolutely clear.

MR. HOTZ: Mr. Davis, how do you account for the difference between the ambient temperatures on the pad which you said were 34 to 36 degrees and these much colder temperatures down in the water trough, and at the field joint of the right solid booster which were 14 to 16 degrees in the water and 19 degrees on the booster?

MR. DAVIS: Okay, let's go back to the 33 and 36-degree reading that I mentioned earlier. What I was reading there was a reflection as well as the fact that I had water that was blowing off the fixed service structure on the side of the solid.

MR. HOTZ: Were these pyrometer readings?

1729

MR. DAVIS: No, the pyrometer readings gave me 23 and 25, but the corrected readings then said that it would have been reading 33 and 36.

MR. HOTZ: No, but what I mean is you were making all of these measurements with the Omegascope. You weren't using any normal thermometers or things like that.

[965] MR. DAVIS: No, sir. Our ambient temperatures at this time, and we had several readings, and we do not use just the coldest that we get, we use a composite average for our calculations for the tank, were reading in the general vicinity of, say, 26 degrees.

Later, at launch time we were up to, I believe, 36 or 38 degrees, and as far as the temperature in the water troughs, we have attempted to explain it, and I am not sure that we have completely put that one to bed, but it appears that this is a real special case that we had in that we had extremely dry air, and it was extremely cold air, like about, say 25 or 26-degree air, and when it acts as a heat transfer material to warm the tank effectively because you are conduction limited through the insulation of the tank, you end up having a sensible heat change, or, to say it another way, the temperature of the air has to go down in order to furnish the heat through the heat leak into the hydrogen

1730

tank and into the oxygen tank. So this will give you a big change in temperature, and it will cause that cold air to fall down.

So we feel a part of the problem in trying to explain all of this came from the fact that cold air was running off the bottom of the tank much like cold air Will run down the side of a Coke bottle or anything else that you have got cold around.

The other thing is that the wind was blowing just right so that it was blowing more on the right hand booster side, and we may have gotten a little bit of it over on that side, and that helps to account for the lower temperature on the right hand booster. And the other area that would account for part of it is night sky radiation. Night sky radiation tends to take either way. I am sure you have all noticed that quite often you will come out in the morning to find ice on your windshield when it never got below freezing the night before, and that is the phenomenon that you see here. And so for that reason we believe that that explains the water trough temperature, that part of it may have been simply that the air was running straight down, and then fanned out and ran over the top of the water, and it did freeze from the top first, and that the other would be it is looking directly at night sky, and so that would

1731

help to chill it also, and you also get some air motion over it which would tend to bring it down, too.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, I understand that there is an investigative group that is working on all aspects of the weather in Cape Kennedy, is that correct? Isn't there a report about to be made on this subject?

COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I think I may more appropriately answer that. That has to do with the environmental weather conditions at Cape Kennedy and improve the forecasting capability of such. It is called the Meteorological Systems Modernization Program, which has since reported to NASA headquarters. There is a team headed up by Dr. John Theon that is looking at improvements to models, instrumentation, and systems which would improve the forecast capability to give us a better forecasting capability at the Cape.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Ride points out that there is an ice team working group that is working at Cape Kennedy.

Are you familiar with that?

MR. STEVENSON: Not in those terms, no, sir.

DR. RIDE: I guess that I was under the impression that there was a group set up originally by the interim board, and then that has either continued on

[966] 1732

or just completed its work to just basically evaluate and assess the things that you found prelaunch and postlaunch.

MR. STEVENSON: I am not aware of that.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we will look into that.

I think we are going to take a recess pretty soon here and ask you gentlemen maybe to come back in the morning.

Before you leave, though, was there any-and we will ask you some more questions in the morning-was there anything that was called to your attention or that you noticed that caused you any concern about whether Challenger should be launched or not? Were you required in your duties to use any discretion in connection with that, or was that something that was passed on to other people and they assessed?

MR. DAVIS: We were specifically asked what we thought about it.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what did you think about it? Did you have any serious concerns or any other concerns about whether that launch should be made?

MR. DAVIS: Well, I had some concerns relative to the ice on the fixed service structure. I didn't know anything about the solid booster problem and all at

1733

the time, and that was that in my experience, when the sun starts to shine on adhered ice on steel structures and other things of that type, it loosens at the interface between the ice and that substructure that is underneath it. And I will let Charlie say what he said about the-because he got asked the same question, but in my answer to the question what I thought about the subject of launching was this, that considering this fact that the ice would get looser as it got warmer, I felt that if we decided or if they decided that we should launch, that they should do it as soon as possible because this rising sun was shining an the fixed service structure as well as the ice that was on the mobile launch platform surface and would tend to loosen it and thereby make it more dangerous as far as a quantity of it falling off, and that if they were going to fly, they should fly as early as possible and not wait until later.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you pass judgment at all or give any advice on whether you thought it was desirable to launch at all or not?

MR. DAVIS: No, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How about you?

MR. STEVENSON: What we really do, we do a total assessment of the pad and the vehicle based upon

1734

the conditions that we observe, and based upon the conditions that we observed, particularly for the flight vehicle, there was no reason to say not to launch. Our concern most of that day, and we spent the last ten hours before launch, we spent at least four hours of that on the pad, our major concern on that day was to facility ice, and once the facility ice problem had been resolved to the point that as long as the ice was not falling into the SRB hole, that there would not be a safety of flight issue, then the team as a whole had no problem with the launch.

DR. RIDE: Did you feel that the ice problem had eased to that point that the ice was no longer going to be falling into the SRB?

MR. STEVENSON: In our mind, and based on our experience, the thing that was missing and that gave us problems as a team was the unknown associated with the aspiration. We were smart enough to figure out that the ice that fell off of the facility would fall off within just free-[967] fall would be 15 to 20 feet away from the edge of the FSS. The big unknown, and for this program we hadn't done any studies on aspiration, and so, and based upon previous launches, which we had not had any problem with the facility icing up the side of the structure, and so we had no data base, let's say, to

1735

make an assessment of the aspirational effects on the falling ice.

And once the management had assessed that problem and had decided that it was not a safety of flight issue for the conditions we had described, then we really didn't have any problem with launching.

The launch film, by the way, does support that they probably did make the right decision in that we do not have any impacts over the vehicle from ice off of the facility. We did have a slight amount of impact to the SRB, left hand SRB aft skirt area, but we had no impacts to the orbiter vehicle.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there any way to judge whether the ice had any impact on the orbiter based upon the pictures?

MR. STEVENSON: Well, the photographs of the film is high speed film, and if there are any impacts to the vehicle, we were able or have been able to determine that there were none.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So far as you can tell, there was no damage?

MR. STEVENSON: No damage to the orbiter vehicle or damage to the SRB.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All right.

Could you provide in the morning some sample

1736

pictures that were taken of your ice?

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If there are no further questions by Commissioners, let's adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:20 o'clock p.m., the Commission recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 o'clock a.m., Thursday, February 27, 1986.)

February 26, 1986 Session (part 1) | Volume 5 index | February 27, 1986 Session